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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article proposes turning plea bargaining into a dialogical 
process, which would result in lessening a defendant’s sense of 
alienation during the progress of the criminal justice procedure. 
To say that plea bargaining “is an essential component of the 
administration of justice”1 is a trite understatement. Plea bargaining 
 
*Professor of Law, College of Law and Business, Ramat Gan, Israel. I thank Boaz Sangero, A.M. 
Goldstein and Alexandria Ashley Johnson for their helpful comments. 
 1.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
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affects every aspect of the criminal justice system;2 it constitutes to a 
large extent the course of criminal justice today.3 Most trials are 
withdrawn, and the vast majority of convictions are attained through 
plea bargaining.4 It is not surprising then, that the United States Supreme 
Court attaches procedural protections to the plea bargaining process, 
such as the right to effective assistance of counsel.5 
Plea bargaining sparks vehement debate among scholars. Some 
scholars argue, for various reasons, that plea bargaining should be 
abolished, and that the criminal justice system can fare better without 
this practice.6 Despite this criticism, the criminal justice system’s 
dependence on plea bargaining to resolve cases implies that it will 
constitute a mainstay of the criminal justice system for the foreseeable 
future.7 Any attempt to reform the system, therefore, should take into 
account the significance of the practice of plea bargaining.8 Accordingly, 
this Article accepts plea bargaining as a given and seeks to improve its 
practice. This Article argues that plea bargaining constitutes an 
 
 2.  Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives 
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983). 
 3.  Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1912 (1992) (stating that “it is the criminal justice system.”); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-
Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 (2001) 
(stating that “[o]ur world is no longer one of trials, but of guilty pleas.”).  
 4.  John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 9 (1978); Markus 
Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal 
Procedure, 49 STAN. L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1997); Bibas, supra note 3, at 1100. See especially 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (stating that “ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).  
 5.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Missouri, 132 S. Ct. at 1407-08; Lafler v. 
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). See generally, Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, Systemic Barriers 
to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2103 (2014). 
 6.  Alschuler, supra note 2, at 931-34; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52 (1968) [hereinafter The Prosecutor’s Role]; Albert 
W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L. J. 1179, 1180 (1975) 
[hereinafter The Defense Attorney’s Role]; See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea 
Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea 
Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1984); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979-80 (1992); Jeff Palmer, Note, Abolishing Plea 
Bargaining: An End to the Same Old Song and Dance, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 505, 508 (1999); See 
generally Tina Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional 
Conditions Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 33 
(2007). See also Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2299-
300 (2006) (suggesting a ban on plea bargaining in weak cases by prohibiting plea bargains that 
offer excessive concessions to defendants).  
 7.  Dubber, supra note 4, at 552; Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. 
REV. 695, 700, 706 (2001) (stating, “In fact, some would argue that the battle against plea 
bargaining has been lost.”).  
 8.  Dubber, supra note 4, at 552. 
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opportunity to circumvent the restrictions that exist during a trial or 
outside a trial, such as the inadmissibility of character evidence, and the 
need for the victim’s consent in restorative justice proceedings. This 
Article proposes to navigate the plea bargaining process in a way that 
creates a real dialogue with defendants. Such a dialogue can reduce the 
sense of alienation that defendants feel from their position as a 
defendant. To accomplish this dialogue, the prosecutor conducting the 
plea bargaining negotiations must be a different person than the 
prosecutor in the trial if negotiations break down. 
This Article is presented in seven parts which are described as 
follows: Part II centers on a defendant’s sense of alienation within the 
criminal justice system in general and within the plea bargaining process 
in particular. Meursault, the protagonist of Albert Camus’ famous 
novella, The Stranger (or The Outsider),9 serves throughout this Article 
as an example of a defendant who is excluded from his criminal justice 
process. Part III discusses the reasons for excluding character evidence 
from a trial. While justifying this rule, this Part defines its costs, using 
the figure of Meursault to exemplify the disadvantages of entering 
character evidence into trial. Part IV suggests making room for dialogue 
within the plea bargaining process in which a prosecutor, who is not in 
charge of conducting the trial against the defendant, would communicate 
the attitude of the prosecution regarding the seriousness of the offense, 
the harm caused to the victim and to society at large, and the 
prosecution’s initial position on the appropriate sentence. The defendant 
would then have the opportunity to present reasons for committing the 
offense, any remorse, and any feelings regarding the victim. In addition, 
the defendant can maintain innocence, assert that the offense committed 
or the degree of his culpability is less serious than that of the charge, or 
point to any mitigating circumstances. Part V explores the possibility of 
partially securing the ends of restorative justice through mutual 
prosecutor-defendant dialogue. Part VI comes to grips with possible 
drawbacks of the dialogue suggestion. Finally, Part VII presents the 
conclusions. 
II. SENSE OF ALIENATION 
Empirical studies point to satisfaction with treatment as a key factor 
in evaluating the performance and legitimacy of legal authorities.10 The 
more a person experiences the process as fair, the easier it is to accept 
 
 9.  ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (Stuart Gilbert trans., 1962). 
 10.  TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 96-97, 103-08 (2006).  
3
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the legal decision.11 The criminal justice process should not only give 
defendants fair treatment, but it should also make them feel that they 
received fair treatment. Treating defendants with respect has a 
therapeutic effect: defendants are willing more readily to accept 
responsibility for their behavior and even to modify it.12 Research shows 
that meaningful participation by the accused person in the criminal 
justice process dramatically increases that individual’s sense of fair 
treatment independently of the final outcome of the trial.13 The feeling 
that one’s voice was heard—that there was the opportunity to present 
arguments and be listened to—bears heavily on a defendant’s evaluation 
of the proceedings.14 There is a connection between a sense of fair 
treatment, including having one’s views considered, and the sense of 
control on the final decision.15 In assessing the fairness of the process, 
accused persons give weight both to respect for their rights and to 
respect for them as human beings.16 The message then conveyed is that 
one is a member of the community.17 
A full criminal trial is certainly an unattractive option in terms of 
the defendant’s degree of participation. Many defendants do not testify 
at trial, and as a result, their version of events is rarely heard.18 
Furthermore, defendants sometimes appear isolated because the focus of 
the trial is on their lawyers.19 
From a normative point of view, defendants want to be listened to, 
and a defendant should participate in the criminal process “as an active 
subject, not merely as a passive object.”20 Meursault was frustrated 
because nobody seemed to be interested in his testimony. After his 
lawyer advised him not to talk at the trial, he felt that “there seemed to 
be a conspiracy to exclude me from the proceedings; I wasn’t to have 
 
 11.  TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 130 (2002); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE 
COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL MOTIVATIONS 128-131 (2011).  
 12.  Amy D. Ronner, Dostoyevsky and the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Confession, 40 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 41, 101 (2006).  
 13.  Id. at 49-50.  
 14.  Stefan Trechsel, Why Must Trials Be Fair? 31 ISR. L. REV. 94, 119 (1997); Richard B. 
Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural 
Protection, 127 PA. L. REV. 111, 122-23 (1978); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, Drug 
Treatment Court: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Applied, 16 TOURO L. REV. 479, 482 (2002). 
 15.  TYLER, supra note 10, at 137. 
 16.  Id. at 138.  
 17.  Id. at 150.  
 18.  Gordon Van Kessel, European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial 
Evidence, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 799, 800 (1998). 
 19.  Id. at 839. 
 20.  R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 39 (1986). 
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any say and my fate was to be decided out of hand.”21 Occasionally, he 
wanted to express his frustration: “But, damn it all, who’s on trial in this 
court, I’d like to know? It’s a serious matter for a man, being accused of 
murder. And I’ve something really important to tell you.”22 
It is only natural that representation by a lawyer, who speaks on 
behalf of the defendant, in a legal language that the latter does not 
understand, would alienate the defendant from the legal process despite 
the many advantages of such representation.23 This sense of alienation 
then makes it difficult for defendants to recognize the justice of their 
conviction.24 
Jonathan Casper succinctly describes the feelings of the defendant 
following an encounter with the criminal justice system: 
When he does get caught, and “they” punish him, he discovers that 
they really don’t care very much about him. He is a nuisance, and they 
treat him as though they would some incidental bother distracting them 
from going about their lives. His interaction with the law—in which he 
finds himself an object in the hands of those who simply wish to get 
rid of him—enforces his own image of himself as an outsider and as a 
“bad person.”25 
When plea bargaining is concerned, defendants often feel that the 
procedure stems from the needs of the criminal justice system rather 
than their own personal needs.26 Nevertheless, defendants are not of the 
opinion that plea bargaining is less fair than a trial.27 It may be that this 
procedure gives more space to the defendant’s interpersonal concerns.28 
The experience of loss of control is difficult, and defendants naturally 
want to decrease this feeling. Defendants want to affect their sentence in 
some way. Having no patience to wait for the outcome of a trial, they 
want their counsel to speak to the prosecutor. But what is the counsel 
supposed to talk about if the defendant is guilty of the charges against 
him and does not deny culpability? Is the prosecutor interested in 
listening to the defendant or to this person’s counsel and in promoting 
honest dialogue before a trial? Should the prosecutor be interested in 
 
 21.  CAMUS, supra note 9, at 124. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Raymond Koen, The Antinomies of Restorative Justice, 2007 ACTA JURIDICA 247, 253 
(2007). 
 24.  DUFF, supra note 20, at 142.  
 25.  JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S PERSPECTIVE 
165 (1972). 
 26.  Id. at 18.  
 27.  TYLER, supra note 10, at 154. 
 28.  Id. at 155.  
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doing so? 
It is claimed that one of the advantages of plea bargaining is that 
“of tailoring sentencing to the needs of individual defendants.”29 
Moreover, plea bargaining allows defendants to actively take part in the 
determination of their sentence and, consequently, engenders in them 
feelings of dignity and a sense of self-worth.30 Casper posits that most 
guilty defendants normally recognize the wrongness of their behavior.31 
They are less willing to participate in determining their sentence, but 
rather want someone to help extricate them from the cycle of crime and 
to lead normal lives.32 Plea bargaining as dialogue can promote all these 
goals. 
III. CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
A. Character Evidence in Camus’ The Stranger 
Plea bargaining as dialogue enables the defendant to introduce 
herself to the prosecutor and to sidestep the almost total lack of reference 
to positive traits of the accused’s personality during the criminal justice 
process. 
Subject to known exceptions, the common law bars the prosecution 
from admitting character evidence to prove the charges against the 
defendant.33 Albert Camus’ novella, The Stranger, illustrates the 
shortcomings of introducing character evidence. 
Meursault, the protagonist, was charged with the murder of an Arab 
(whose name is not mentioned) at the beach. This Arab had previously 
attacked Meursault’s friend. After seeing a knife in the Arab’s hand and 
while blinded by the sun, Meursault fired one bullet, which killed the 
attacker. Then, in the heat of a trance, he fired four more shots into the 
 
 29.  CASPER, supra note 25, at 93. 
 30.  Id. at 94 (citing Arnold Enker, Perspectives on Plea-Bargaining, President’s Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts, 116 (1967). See 
also Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 944-45 (2007) (stating that “in addition to their attributed 
efficiency, plea bargaining practices can be normatively anchored in the defendant’s autonomy of 
will, and in his right to effective control of his fate.”). 
 31.  Id. at 97, 146.  
 32.  CASPER, supra note 25, at 97.  
 33.  Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); Martin F. Kaplan, Character 
Testimony 150, 150-51, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE (Saul M. Kassin 
& Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Kenneth J. Melilli, The Character Evidence Rule 
Revisited, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1547. Rule 404(a) states that “evidence of a person’s character 
or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on 
a particular occasion.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a). 
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inert body. 
During Meursault’s trial, his character and his treatment of his 
mother, especially the fact that he had not cried at his mother’s funeral, 
became the focal point of the proceedings and was taken as an indication 
of his guilt as a murderer. The presiding judge, while interviewing 
Meursault privately in his office, admitted that he strove to get to know 
the character of the accused: “What really interests me is—you!”34 The 
judge also asked Meursault whether he had loved his mother35 and 
whether he believed in God.36 
In the Assize court where Meursault’s trial was held, the presiding 
judge asked him questions that “might seem foreign to the case, but 
actually were highly relevant,”37 such as why had he sent his mother to a 
home for the elderly and whether parting from his mother hard for him.38 
The warden of the home for the elderly testified to Meursault’s calmness 
during his mother’s funeral, noting that he had refused to look at his 
mother’s corpse and that he did not even remember his mother’s age.39 
The doorkeeper of the home testified that Meursault had smoked 
cigarettes and drank coffee during the night he sat near his mother’s 
coffin.40 The old man who had been his mother’s friend testified that he 
did not notice Meursault crying; however, he hardly ever noticed him 
and could not testify whether he had or had not cried.41 Meursault’s 
defense counsel remarked on this person’s testimony: “That is typical of 
the way this case is being conducted. No attempt is being made to elicit 
the true facts.”42 Céleste, the owner of the restaurant where Meursault 
used to dine, testified that Meursault was “all right.”43 The judge, 
however, did not allow Céleste to dwell on this testimony.44 When 
Marie, Meursault’s lover, testified, the prosecutor tried to prove that her 
relationship with the accused had begun the day after Meursault’s 
mother’s funeral.45 Upon the conclusion of her testimony, the prosecutor 
made the following innuendo: “Gentlemen of the jury, I would have you 
note that on the next day after his mother’s funeral that man was visiting 
 
 34.  CAMUS, supra note 9, at 82. 
 35.  Id. at 83. 
 36.  Id. at 86. 
 37.  Id. at 109. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 111. 
 40.  Id. at 112. 
 41.  Id. at 114. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id. at 115. 
 44.  Id. at 116. 
 45.  Id. at 117. 
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the swimming pool, starting a liaison with a girl, and going to see a 
comic film. That is all I wish to say.”46 
After that remark, nobody seemed to listen to the next witness on 
behalf of Meursault.47 His defense counsel tried in vain to protest the 
prosecution’s conclusion, asking, “[I]s my client on trial for having 
buried his mother, or for killing a man?”48 The prosecutor responded to 
this challenge by insisting that there was “a vital link” between the two 
events and declaring, “I accuse the prisoner of behaving at his mother’s 
funeral in a way that showed he was already a criminal at heart.”49 As 
Meursault later related, the prosecutor’s summing up to the jury 
“stressed my heartlessness, my inability to state Mother’s age, my visit 
to the swimming pool where a Fernandel film was showing, and finally 
my return with Marie to my rooms.”50 The prosecutor had also stressed 
Meursault’s education and intelligence to prove premeditation, causing 
Meursault to wonder how a good trait like intelligence militated against 
a defendant as proof of guilt.51 The prosecutor further called Meursault 
“an inhuman monster wholly without a moral sense”52 and depicted him 
as a person with no soul, inhuman, devoid of “those moral qualities 
which normal men possess,”53 lacking “every decent instinct,” and 
constituting “a menace to society.”54 The prosecutor’s excessive 
characterization of the accused reached its peak when he compared 
Meursault’s callousness to patricide, a crime for which another person 
was supposed to be brought to trial the next day. “This man, who is 
morally guilty of his mother’s death,” the prosecutor charged, “is no less 
unfit to have a place in the community than that other man who did to 
death the father that begat him. And, indeed, the one crime led on to the 
other; the first of these two criminals, the man in the dock, set a 
precedent, if I may put it so, and authorized the second crime.”55 The 
comparison, he made it clear, lead to but one conclusion: “I am 
convinced . . . that you will not find I am exaggerating the case against 
the prisoner when I say that he is also guilty of the murder to be tried 
 
 46.  Id. at 118. 
 47.  Id. at 119. 
 48.  Id. at 121. 
 49.  Id. at 122. 
 50.  Id. at 125. 
 51.  Id. at 126. 
 52.  Id. at 120. 
 53.  Id. at 127. 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 128. 
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tomorrow in this court, and I look to you for a verdict accordingly.”56 
It was Meursault’s personality that was on trial, not any purported 
act. As he described the proceedings: “[A]nd certainly in the speeches of 
my lawyer and the prosecuting counsel a great deal was said about me; 
more, in fact, about me personally than about my crime.”57 The 
prosecutor claimed that he had succeeded in penetrating Meursault’s 
soul,58 but the defense counsel used the same tactic: “I, too . . . have 
closely studied this man’s soul; but, unlike my learned friend for the 
prosecution, I have found something there. Indeed, I may say that I have 
read the prisoner’s mind like an open book.” He found Meursault to be 
“an excellent young fellow, a steady, conscientious worker who did his 
best by his employer . . . was popular with everyone and sympathetic in 
other’s troubles . . . a dutiful son . . . .”59 Actually, no one had made any 
effort to understand Meursault’s inner world view.60 His personality, 
though it had been the focus of the legal proceedings, was simply 
eradicated. 
The Stranger illustrates how relying on character evidence to 
decide guilt or innocence is problematic. Numerous justifications have 
been provided for prohibiting character evidence. This Article analyzes 
their central arguments with the aid of Camus’ The Stranger. 
B. Justifications for the Character Evidence Prohibition 
1. Character Evidence Possesses Little Probative Value 
The United States Supreme Court has excluded character evidence 
“despite its admitted probative value.”61 Nevertheless, scholars have 
found the probative value of character evidence to be doubtful.62 
Unfaithfulness to a spouse, friends, or one’s place of work, for example, 
 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  Id. at 123. 
 58.  Id. at 127. 
 59.  Id. at 131. 
 60.  Robert Batey, Literature in a Criminal Law Course: Aeschylus, Burgess, Oates, Camus, 
Poe, and Melville, 22 LEGAL STUD. FORUM 45, 71 (1998) (regarding the judge). 
 61.  Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948). 
 62.  Miguel Angel Mendez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code 
Section 352 and the Impact of Recent Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1984); 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens 
Rea: The Doctrines That Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 130 MIL. L. REV. 
41, 49 (1990); Chris William Sanchirico, Character Evidence and the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1227, 1234 (2001). 
9
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does not bear on criminal activities.63 Although there are situations in 
which character evidence is relevant,64 character evidence is excluded 
because its slight probative value does not in the majority of cases justify 
its costs.65 
2. Character Evidence is Prejudicial 
Character evidence is claimed to be prejudicial to the defendant.66 
The jury may, in overestimating the evidence, assume that if the 
defendant had once committed a crime, he may repeat criminal acts.67 
Based to a large extent on the assumption that “once a criminal, always a 
criminal,”68 character evidence may create a presumption of guilt and 
weaken the presumption of innocence,69 and it violates the defendant’s 
dignity and autonomy to choose to refrain from committing offenses.70 
Character evidence that is negative may arouse the jury’s hostility 
toward the defendant and cause them to decide the case on the basis of 
the defendant’s character regardless of whether he is guilty of the 
offense with which he is charged.71 The jury may simply think that the 
defendant deserves punishment because of his bad character.72 If, 
moreover, the jury is persuaded that the defendant has committed 
uncharged crimes, they may feel that justice would be done by a 
 
 63.  Mendez, supra note 62, at 1019. 
 64.  Peter Tillers, What Is Wrong with Character Evidence? 49 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 785 
(1998) (stating that “a considerable amount of character evidence has a substantial amount of 
probative value.”).  
 65.  James Landon, Note, Character Evidence: Getting to the Root of the Problem Through 
Comparison, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 581, 596 (1997).  
 66.  Mendez, supra note 62, at 1006, 1044 (stating that “[p]sychological studies confirm the 
intuitive belief that character evidence can be highly prejudicial.”); Donald M. 
Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the Federal Capital Murder 
Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349, 369 (2007). 
 67.  Mendez, supra note 62, at 1007, 1042; Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 51.  
 68.  Colin Miller, Impeachable Offenses?: Why Civil Parties in Quasi-Criminal Cases Should 
Be Treated Like Criminal Defendants Under the Felony Impeachment Rule, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 997, 
1002 (2009). 
 69.  Landon, supra note 65, at 592; Josephine Ross, “He Looks Guilty”: Reforming Good 
Character Evidence to Undercut the Presumption of Guilt, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 228 (2004). 
 70.  Tillers, supra note 64, at 795 n. 32; ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 32 
(2005).  
 71.  Mendez, supra note 62, at 1006; Jeffrey Omar Usman, Ancient and Modern Character 
Evidence: How Character Evidence Was Used in Ancient Athenian Trials, Its Uses in the United 
States, and What This Means for How These Democratic Societies Understand the Role of Jurors, 
33 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 1, 30 (2008); Barrett J. Anderson, Note, Recognizing Character: A New 
Perspective on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1929 (2012). 
 72.  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997); Mendez, supra note 62, at 1007; 
Landon, supra note 65, at 589. 
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conviction for the current offense regardless of the evidence.73 Character 
evidence enhances, therefore, the risk of convicting an innocent person 
who has a criminal history.74 Additionally, the very fact that the 
defendant has been charged may affect the jury’s perception of the 
defendant’s personality: it makes it easier for the jury to believe the bad 
character evidence rather than the good.75 In The Stranger, the 
prosecutor succeeded in depicting Meursault as possessing a criminal 
mind and persuaded the jury that the accused’s indifference toward his 
mother shed light on his motive to kill. Meursault’s indifference toward 
his mother became more meaningful than the crime he had allegedly 
committed. He was sentenced to death because of what was viewed as 
his heartlessness toward his mother. His trial was effectually turned into 
a case of matricide. 
3. The Ability to Become Acquainted with a Person’s Character 
It is very easy to maneuver character evidence. We can say one 
thing and its opposite about almost every person. For example, we may 
know a person in one particular aspect of her life as an employee, as an 
employer, or as a colleague, but chances are that we do not know how 
she behaves at home. Additionally, humans are complex. A pleasant 
person can be a swindler. A pleasant man at work can treat his wife and 
children abusively. People also may or may not act in conformity with 
their character.76 
Moreover, it is very doubtful whether we can become acquainted 
with a person’s character. In regard to Meursault, for example, all 
readers are given the same information about him; however, scholars 
have different evaluations of his personality. 
Thus, Camus himself views his protagonist as a person whose main 
problem is that he does not play society’s game.77 Weisberg views 
Meursault as a “working man, straightforward and mildly intelligent 
whose main defects are an inability to use words in a socially acceptable 
way and a concomitant susceptibility to purely naturalistic influences.”78 
 
 73.  Imwinkelried, supra note 62, at 48. 
 74.  Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV. 
1321, 1339 (2003). 
 75.  Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly 
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 525 (1983). 
 76.  STEIN, supra note 70, at 183-84.  
 77.  8 RAYMOND GAY-CROSIER, LITERARY MASTERPIECES: THE STRANGER 66 (2002). 
 78.  RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN 
MODERN FICTION 116 (1984).  
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According to Richard Weisberg, Meursault is a little bit bizarre, non-
conformist, but has no moral aberration, and is certainly not a monster.79 
Nevertheless, “during the legal process, Meursault’s non-malicious and 
even admirable economy of sentiment is transformed into a serialized 
portrait of a ‘monstrous’ individual.”80 Weisberg concludes that in an 
American court, where character evidence is inadmissible, “Meursault 
might have received a relatively light sentence for manslaughter.”81 
As opposed to Weisberg, Judge Richard Posner estimates 
differently both Meursault’s character and the outcome of the trial had 
character evidence been excluded. According to Posner, Meursault is 
devoid of a conscience82 and lacks an inner conversation between the 
different parts of the self.83 As to the outcome of the trial, Posner 
believes that since Meursault did not feel threatened by his victim and 
since the four shots he fired into the inert body is evidence of 
premeditation, Meursault’s conviction of murder would have remained 
intact even had his character not been placed as an issue at trial.84 Posner 
treats Meursault as a loathsome and “too dangerous to leave at large” 
offender.85 In his view, extolling Meursault is even immoral: “Indeed, 
could it not be thought shameful of Camus to invite the reader to take 
Meursault’s part by depicting him as victim rather than killer and by 
depersonalizing the real victim? Not only shameful, but incoherent?”86 
One further point is that a person may also not know himself. Being 
aware of his complexity, he may not always characterize himself as 
patient or impatient, generous or stingy. He is aware of the fact of being 
able to behave in one way or another in the same situation.87 Expert 
character testimony, therefore, would be of no avail to shed light on his 
personality. 88 
 
 79.  Richard H. Weisberg, Comparative Law in Comparative Literature: The Figure of the 
“Examining Magistrate” in Dostoevski and Camus, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 237, 258 (1976). See also 
WEISBERG, supra note 78, at 116, 121.  
 80.  WEISBERG, supra note 78, at 121.  
 81.  Id. at 121-22.  
 82.  RICHARD H. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 60 (3d ed., 2009).  
 83.  Id. at 64.  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id. at 65.  
 86.  Id.  
 87.  See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 158 (stating that “people are inconsistent in their behavior. 
Traits change over time, and the same traits operate differently in different contexts.”). 
 88.  For a suggestion on the use of expert character testimony in trials, see Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1991).  
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4. Shifting the Focus and Consuming Time 
Admitting character evidence may turn this kind of evidence into 
the centerpiece of the trial, thereby diverting attention away from the 
offense committed to the defendant’s general character.89 Another 
disadvantage is that admitting character evidence can be extremely time 
and resource consuming;90 in fact, entering character evidence into the 
trial may result in the proceedings becoming a never-ending trial. Every 
person who met the defendant at one time in his life may offer character 
evidence as Masson, one of the witnesses in The Stranger, actually did. 
The question of whether the defendant committed, say, a robbery is quite 
limited. But how can we stop testimony about one’s character? Wasting 
the court’s time in this way should be prohibited, not least owing to 
considerations of efficiency. 
C. Against Anonymity 
Despite the strong arguments to the contrary, exclusion of character 
evidence is also problematic. Good character evidence humanizes the 
defendant.91 A feeling that character does not matter may create 
alienation and bitterness toward the criminal justice system. Conducting 
a trial without any reference to the defendant’s character may turn the 
defendant into a number. 
Jeffrey Murphy distinguishes between retributive punishment based 
on the seriousness of the offense and its circumstances and retributive 
punishment based on the defendant’s character.92 The latter assumes the 
possibility of distinguishing between the offense and the offender,93 and 
that “an error can be forgiven if it is seen as ‘out of character.’”94 And, 
indeed, a person’s good character, which includes the absence of a 
criminal history and contribution to society, is taken into account as a 
mitigating factor in sentencing.95 According to the Sentencing 
 
 89.  Landon, supra note 65, at 594-95. 
 90.  Mendez, supra note 62, at 1006; Anderson, supra note 71, at 1930. 
 91.  Ross, supra note 69, at 270. 
 92.  Jeffrie G. Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment 14, 43 in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN 
HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988). See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 213-14 (6th ed. 2012). 
 93.  Hagit Benbaji & David Heyd, The Charitable Perspective: Forgiveness and Toleration 
as Supererogatory, 31 CAN. J. PHIL. 567, 571-72 (2001).  
 94.  Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 496 
(1997). 
 95.  On taking into consideration the lack of a criminal record, see Andrew von Hirsch, Doing 
Justice: The Principle of Commensurate Deserts 243, 244, in SENTENCING (Hyman Gross & 
Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981). On considering character evidence in sentencing, see Sanchirico, 
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Guidelines, acceptance of responsibility is also a mitigating factor.96 
During the sentencing phase, the judge is exposed to the defendant’s 
character through the probation officer’s report.97 However, reference to 
the defendant’s character should begin at an earlier stage of the criminal 
justice process. 
Meursault’s trial stands in stark contrast to the process that 
characterized the trial of Galin E. Frye of Missouri.98 Frye’s case 
illustrates an extreme situation of excluding the defendant from his own 
legal proceedings. The defendant was charged with driving with a 
revoked license.99 Because Frye had already been convicted of this 
offense three times in the past, the State of Missouri now accused him of 
a class D felony, which is punishable by a maximum of four years in 
prison.100 The prosecutor sent a letter to Frye’s defense counsel offering 
the choice of one of two suggestions, both of them a take it or leave it 
deal. One suggestion was that Frye would admit to a felony offense 
punishable by a maximum of three years imprisonment and serve 
“shock” time in jail for ten days. The second suggestion was that Frye 
would admit to a misdemeanor offense, which is punishable by 
maximum of one-year imprisonment and serve ninety days in jail.101 The 
prosecutor added that the offers would expire on a certain date. Frye’s 
lawyer did not inform him of the offers, which were subsequently 
withdrawn for lack of the defendant’s consent.102 
Frye’s story shows how a defendant in a criminal trial could be 
treated as a number rather as a human being. There was only a letter 
setting out the offer and a deadline. There was not even a short 
conversation with the defendant or his defense counsel before the “offer” 
of imprisonment was made. The prosecutor’s suggestions were 
unheedful of the defendant’s concerns. Neither Frye’s personality nor 
the impact of imprisonment on him and his family apparently concerned 
the prosecutor at all. All that mattered was to get rid of the case and to 
proceed with other files, hopefully in the same way. Undoubtedly, plea 
bargaining of this type, if it can be called that, does not lessen but, on the 
contrary, increases the defendant’s feelings of bitterness and frustration 
 
supra note 62, at 1268.  
 96.  Tung Yin, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement 
in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83 CAL. L. REV. 419, 434 (1995). 
 97.  CASPER, supra note 25, at 86; Yin, supra note 96, at 448. 
 98.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 99.  Id. at 1404. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id.  
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during the criminal justice process. These feelings are probably felt more 
keenly when an offer is not even communicated to the defendant. 
Some obvious facts should be recalled. The power of the litigating 
parties is not equal.103 “Plea bargain is inherently coercive for the 
accused; his ambit of choice is determined by the state.”104 The 
defendant has no choice; she cannot cut herself off from the proceedings, 
which are being conducted against her, and is forced to be in some 
contact with law enforcement agencies.105 
Normally, there are no true negotiations between the prosecutor and 
the defendant, represented by a defense counsel.106 The prosecutor is the 
one who dictates the conditions of the agreement.107 “‘Plea bargaining’ 
is in reality the prosecutor’s unilateral administrative determination of 
the level of the defendant’s criminal culpability and the appropriate 
punishment for him.”108 Even when negotiations occur, they often bear 
the character of a poker game.109 
John Griffiths’ family model suggests that one should think of the 
relationship between state agents and offenders as a relationship between 
parents and children, and offenders should be treated accordingly with 
care.110 Parents, of course, are supposed to speak with their children, 
communicate to them the wrongness of their conduct, listen to their 
explanations, and respond to them. 
IV. DIALOGUE THROUGH PLEA BARGAINING 
As we have seen, character evidence may distort justice. A lack of 
character evidence, however, strips the defendant of his unique human 
characteristics. Plea bargaining as dialogue may sidestep the problem of 
character evidence and suggest a middle path between exploring the 
defendant’s soul, as illustrated by The Stranger, and addressing the 
defendant as a pure number devoid of personality, as reflected in the 
 
 103.  Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1134 
(1998).  
 104.  Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, 
Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 699 (1975). 
 105.  Goldstein, supra note 104, at 699; Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, 
Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 908 (2004). 
 106.  Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 45 (1983). 
 107.  Id. at 38. 
 108.  Id.  
 109.  See, e.g., The Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 6, at 68.  
 110.  John Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third “Model” of the Criminal 
Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359, 379 (1970).  
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kind of plea bargaining offered to Galin E. Frye of Missouri. This 
intermediate approach is manifested in the conducting of true 
negotiations between prosecutor and defendant in which the defendant 
and the defense counsel are given the opportunity to present the 
defendant’s positive traits. 
A defendant’s ability to take an active part in the proceedings 
against him maintains the defendant’s dignity as a human being.111 
Scholars view plea bargaining as granting defendants an opportunity to 
participate in determining their fate. This description of empowerment, 
however, does not accord with reality, in which “plea bargains often 
result from a quick phone call or hallway conversation between 
prosecutor and defense counsel.”112 It would be very odd to contend that 
Frye was empowered as a result of his plea bargaining experience. It is 
more accurate to say that he experienced a sense of disempowerment. 
Such an experience also undermines the goals of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence strives to use law “to function as a kind 
of therapist or therapeutic agent.”113 It uses social sciences to examine 
how law can promote the physical and psychological well-being of an 
individual.114 However, if the defendant is not involved in the plea 
bargaining process, no therapeutic effect can be achieved.115 
Disparity of power between the prosecutor and the accused is 
inherent in the criminal process. It is not only the resources available to 
law enforcement authorities and their ability to gather evidence that lead 
to the disparity. Even when the defendant is a wealthy person, the 
imbalance is created from the asymmetry in trial results to the parties. 
The defendant is the one who is exposed to the dangers of conviction 
and the deprivation of liberty, a situation that makes him most 
vulnerable.116 Therefore, no kind of negotiations would cancel the 
disparity in bargaining power between the prosecutor and the defendant. 
The defendant, as the one whose life will be affected directly from the 
 
 111.  STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 247 (2005) (regarding 
the right to counsel).  
 112.  John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea 
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 484 (2001). 
 113.  David B. Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 259, 259 (1994). 
 114.  Trent Oram & Kara Gleckler, An Analysis of the Constitutional Issues Implicated in Drug 
Courts, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 471, 474 (2006); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 24 (2009). 
 115.  Wexler, supra note 113, at 261.  
 116.  Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice? 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 626 
(1999). 
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outcome of the trial, has simply much more to lose. 
Still, negotiations that enable a defendant to express his opinions 
and wishes places the defendant in a higher status compared to the 
accused’s status during pre-trial investigation and the trial itself.117 
Israeli Supreme Court Justice Eliyahu Matza has stated that the 
adversarial criminal justice system dictates not only a conflict between 
the rival parties but also a dialogue between them, which could be 
implemented within the framework of plea bargaining.118 Indeed, the 
very dialogue between defendant and prosecution can lead to reducing 
the former’s sense of alienation, felt throughout the criminal justice 
process. 
Dialogue will enable the defendant to freely give his version of the 
events. He would then obtain the opportunity to play a meaningful role 
during the legal process even if he wanted to waive trial by issuing a 
guilty plea. 
The United States Supreme Court has attached great importance to 
the role that counsel should play in providing mental support for the 
defendant. The presence and advice of counsel are supposed to dissipate 
the coercive impact of any offer of leniency in return for the defendant’s 
guilty plea.119 The Court, in fact, has held that defendants are entitled to 
the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during plea 
negotiations.120 
Since the defense counsel’s main work is conducted with the 
prosecutor to obtain a plea bargain, the former should be an effective 
negotiator in order to achieve optimal results for the client.121 During the 
negotiations, defense counsel can show to the prosecutor the defendant’s 
good traits so that the accused will be able to feel that he is being 
addressed as a human being, not as a monster. 
Obviously, a serious gap exists between the ideal role of defense 
counsel and the way this function is implemented in practice.122 Not only 
prosecutors but many defense counsel, as well, assume the defendant’s 
 
 117.  Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of 
Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 37 
(2004). 
 118.  Crim. App. 4722/92 Markovitz v. State of Israel, 47(2) P.D. 45, 57 (1993).  
 119.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970). 
 120.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 121.  Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic 
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 74 (1995). 
 122.  The Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 6, at 1180; Jenny Roberts, Why 
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 277, 318 (2011) (regarding misdemeanor defense counsel).  
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guilt to be undisputed.123 Defense counsel may even have incentives to 
encourage a plea of guilty from the client.124 In addition, defense counsel 
are generally overloaded and may have little or no time to spend trying 
to understand the defendant’s motives or bothering to present the 
defendant’s character and background in the most beneficial way.125 
There are defense counsel who implicitly convey the message that they 
are not concerned about their client’s guilt or innocence.126 No theory 
can make a lawyer who does not take into account the interests of the 
client be concerned about their client’s guilt or innocence. 
Direct dialogue between prosecutor and defendant will enable the 
defendant to receive direct information from the prosecutor and help 
sidestep any such problems in representation. The defendant, especially 
one who does not enjoy zealous representation, could take the 
opportunity to be introduced directly to the prosecutor without any 
barriers. Speaking up does not require familiarity with substantive or 
procedural criminal law. Almost everyone can just relate her side of the 
case. 
That said, most defense counsel do provide competent 
representation. Generally, the skills of public defenders do not fall short 
of those of prosecutors.127 Moreover, many defense counsel do evince 
concern about their clients’ welfare and perceive their own role also as a 
kind of social worker.128 They understand that the criminal justice 
process may be a traumatic experience for their clients and are inclined 
to soften it for them.129 
Competent defense counsel should present the defendant’s personal 
story to the prosecutor. Having a good character and leading an honest 
life may—not must, of course—prove that the defendant was unlikely to 
 
 123.  Gifford, supra note 106, at 53. See also BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, 
ACTUAL INNOCENCE 190 (2000) (regarding disbelief of many defense counsel in their client’s 
innocence). 
 124.  On these incentives, see Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 
1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 238-41; Palmer, supra note 6, at 520-21; F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma 
M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense 
Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 219 (2002); Cook, supra note 105, at 901. 
 125.  On overloaded defense counsel who make no effective representation or have only little 
time for their clients, see CASPER, supra note 25, at 106; Joy & Uphoff, supra note 5, at 2113-14. 
 126.  The Defense Attorney’s Role, supra note 6 at n. 280. 
 127.  Hon J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
1099, 1127-28 (2014).  
 128.  Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal 
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CAL. L. REV. 425, 483-84 (2004).  
 129.  Id. at 483-84. 
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have engaged in a heinous crime.130 Even when not a case of innocence, 
if the defendant’s attorney had functioned effectively as a negotiator and 
presented to the prosecutor data such as the impact of imprisonment on 
the defendant and the well-being of his family, there is more of a chance 
of receiving better results for the defendant.131 
Because plea bargaining is the most common means of satisfying 
criminal justice, the traditional functions of a trial should be moved into 
the plea bargaining regime. Indeed, scholars have expressed uneasiness 
at the current format of negotiating a plea bargain, which offers 
defendants leniency only in exchange for a guilty plea, impliedly 
waiving the right to contest the charges and the privilege against self-
incrimination. It has been proposed to expand the format of negotiations 
to include the conduct of the trial so that, for example, the defendant 
would agree to waive some of the procedural rights granted at trial 
instead of pleading guilty in exchange for concessions from the 
prosecutor.132 
Bibas suggests the interesting possibility of allowing crime victims 
to express their feelings and to forgive the offender in appropriate cases 
through the plea-bargaining process. Additionally, the victim and the 
defendant should have the opportunity to meet and talk during these 
proceedings, at which time defendants should have the opportunity to 
manifest remorse and offer restitution to victims.133 This suggestion 
leads to the next advantage of plea bargaining as dialogue: securing 
some of the aims of restorative justice without depending on the victim’s 
attitude toward the defendant. 
V. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE THROUGH PLEA BARGAINING 
Restorative justice seeks “better ways of doing justice.”134 Aiming 
at reconciliation between the parties and repair of the harm caused, it 
 
 130.  See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476 (1948) (stating that the defendant 
“may introduce affirmative testimony that the general estimate of his character is so favorable that 
the jury may infer that he would not be likely to commit the offense charged. This privilege is 
sometimes valuable to a defendant for this Court has held that such testimony alone, in some 
circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt.”). 
 131.  Gifford, supra note 106, at 67. 
 132.  Oren Gazal-Ayal & Avishalom Tor, The Innocence Effect, 62 DUKE L.J. 339, 396 (2012); 
Gregory M. Gilchrist, Counsel’s Role in Bargaining for Trials, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1979, 1981-82 
(2014); Fisher, supra note 30, at 945 (suggesting waiving the right to the criminal standard of 
proof). 
 133.  Bibas, supra note 3, at 1184-85. 
 134.  Jennifer J. Llewellyn et al., Imagining Success for a Restorative Approach to Justice: 
Implications for Measurement and Evaluation, 26 DALHOUSIE L.J. 281, 284 (2013). 
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focuses upon relationships among the victim, the offender, and the 
community.135 
Restorative justice allows the defendant to understand the human 
side of the harm that was caused.136 People’s attitudes following the 
offense reflect the importance of the social norm violated.137 
Undoubtedly, an apology that is attendant upon repentance may 
have a curative effect on the victim.138 Many victims prefer forgiveness 
over retribution.139 Plea bargaining negotiations may provide an 
excellent opportunity for a remedial offender-victim encounter.140 The 
prosecutor could simply enter the victim into the dialogue with the 
defendant in appropriate cases and at the appropriate time. 
The process of restorative justice normally depends on the consent 
of the victim.141 This is a serious flaw. It is claimed that taking the 
victim’s position toward the defendant into account has nothing to do 
with the search for justice. The fate of the defendant does not have to be 
dependent on the position of one individual or another but on the degree 
of the blameworthiness of the accused.142 
Nor should the victim determine the proper punishment.143 Lacking 
objectivity, the victim’s response is subjective and depends on his 
personal characteristics, as well as the point in time in his life.144 As 
opposed to the prosecutor, the victim does not have to take into account 
the public interest or the principle of proportionality in inflicting the 
proper punishment. Hence, taking the victim’s view into account might 
violate the equality requirement, which necessitates that two offenders 
who committed the same offense with the same degree of culpability 
 
 135.  Id. at 301.  
 136.  Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, The Vices of “Restorative 
Justice”, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 375 (2003). 
 137.  Id.  
 138.  Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law—the 
Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Criminal Code Structure: Victims, Apology, and 
Restorative Justice in Criminal Procedure: Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 
295-97 (2007).  
 139.  Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L. J. 85, 137 (2004). 
 140.  Etienne & Robbennolt, supra note 138, at 298. 
 141.  Hadar Dancig-Rosenberg & Tali Gal, Restorative Criminal Justice, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2313, 2343 (2013).  
 142.  Robinson, supra note 136, at 381.  
 143.  Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 65, 67 (1999). 
 144.  John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian? 46 
UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1744 (1999); Moore, supra note 143, at 75-76. 
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deserve an identical punishment.145 Additionally, repentance (of course, 
by a guilty offender) should be encouraged, given the importance of 
sincere repentance both to the offender and to society at large.146 There 
are victims, however, who are not satisfied by repentance; and 
occasionally for very justifiable reasons, they are not interested in any 
contact with the offender. The thought that a reluctant victim has a veto 
over the fate of the offender, especially if the latter was trying to 
partially repair the harm through repentance and making amends, may 
discourage the offender from any attempt at rehabilitation.147 
Dialogue between the prosecutor, who represents society, and the 
defendant can take place even without the involvement of the victim. 
Although not every victim—nor, for that matter, every offender—is 
eligible for restorative justice processes,148 dialogue between prosecutor 
and defendant can almost always take place. Victimless offenses, such as 
importing drugs or tax evasion, are an example. Some of the goals of 
restorative justice may still be secured without a victim’s participation in 
the process. When the prosecutor communicates to the defendant how 
society perceives the offense and the harm caused to the victim, the 
defendant can respond to the criticism. This dialogue may enable the 
defendant to internalize the prosecutor’s perception, accepting 
responsibility for the misdeed and understanding its wrongness. Direct 
dialogue with the prosecutor, then, may inspire repentance and 
modification of the defendant’s conduct. 
Of course, face-to-face encounters in which the victim relates his 
feelings about the offense can perhaps more deeply permeate the heart of 
the defendant. However, the latter can also absorb the harm caused 
through a third party who reflects the impact of the offense on the victim 
and on other parties affected by the offense and tries to convey the 
perspective of society and the victim alike. 
Obviously, the plea negotiation process between the prosecutor and 
the defendant does not rule out a restorative justice process with the 
victim’s participation in appropriate cases. 
Normally, it is easier for defendants to communicate their views to 
a prosecutor outside of the trial process. In conversing with the 
prosecutor, the defendant does not have to worry about what is said; his 
 
 145.  Moore, supra note 143, at 77. 
 146.  Rinat Kitai-Sangero & Itay Lipschits, The Place of Repentance in Retributive Sentencing, 
7 IJPS 107, 108-09 (2011).  
 147.  Id. at 120-21.  
 148.  Cian Logan, Restorative Justice: Encouraging More Meaningful Engagement with the 
Criminal Justice System, 13 U. C. DUBLIN L. REV. 39, 40 (2013).  
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words will not militate against him because negotiations with the 
prosecutor to establish a plea bargain are confidential. Defendants can 
simply tell their own story from their own perspective. Even a person 
with an extensive criminal record has a story; e.g., the circumstances that 
led up to the offense. By listening, the prosecutor accords the defendant 
respect. In this way, a dialogue with the prosecutor may empower the 
defendant and reduce any sense of loss of control that is felt. Being a 
partner in the dialogue imparts a sense of choice rather than a feeling of 
coercion. 
VI. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS 
The suggestion to establish a true dialogue between the defendant 
and a representative of the prosecution’s office carries some drawbacks. 
The following subsections will come to grips with them. 
A. Time-Consuming 
The main goal of plea bargaining is to clear dockets. Caseload 
pressures render the suggestion to make a genuine dialogue with 
defendants unattractive to prosecutors and defense counsel alike. 
Overburdened prosecutors and defense counsel have no time for true 
negotiations.149 They want to move quickly to the next case. Obviously, 
the prosecution may see no reason to devote resources to this purpose. 
Moreover, it can be argued that the willingness of prosecutors to offer 
plea bargains will be reduced in view of the effort required to conduct a 
time-consuming dialogue. Many defense counsel, for their part, tend to 
accept the prosecutor’s evaluations as to the appropriate punishment and 
are not accustomed to, and perhaps are not interested in, negotiating with 
the prosecutor adversarially.150 Efficiency is an essential component of 
the criminal justice system.151 There is not sufficient time to treat every 
defendant as unique.152 As Markus Dubber observes, “[O]ffenders and 
victims alike are irrelevant nuisances, grains of sand in the great 
machine of state risk management.”153 
However, the time consumed by negotiations to obtain a guilty plea 
 
 149.  Cf. Gilchrist, supra note 132, at 1997.  
 150.  Gifford, supra note 106, at 51. 
 151.  Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, American Criminal Procedure in a European Context, 21 CARDOZO 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 409, 458 (2013).  
 152.  Taslitz, supra note 88, at 4, 18. 
 153.  Markus Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal 
Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 849 (2001).  
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would be much shorter than the time consumed by cases that go to trial. 
Communicating a defendant’s character and personal circumstances to 
the prosecutor and communicating the prosecutor’s message regarding 
the offense to the defendant would involve a reasonable expenditure of 
time. Moreover, it involves neither witness inconvenience nor court 
time. 
B. Harming the Defense 
It may be argued that the conduct of a true dialogue within the plea 
bargaining process would be harmful to the defense in the event that 
negotiations fail. In this case, the defendant’s attempt to claim innocence 
or to raise arguments in her defense may actually be helpful to the 
prosecution. Giving the prosecution advance knowledge of the central 
arguments of the defense may buttress weaknesses in the prosecution’s 
case,154 and better prepare the prosecutor for trial. Additionally, prior 
personal acquaintance with the defendant may provide the prosecutor 
with an advantage in conducting cross-examination. 
To ensure the exchange of information without fear of devastating 
consequences, the plea bargaining negotiations with the defendant ought 
to be conducted by a different prosecutor from the one who would 
conduct the trial and should be confidential. Separating the prosecutor 
who conducts the trial from the prosecutor who conducts the 
negotiations will also create internal supervision within the prosecution 
on the conduct and the content of the plea bargain. Concentrating too 
much power in the hands of one prosecutor is generally not a desirable 
situation.155 
C. Faking Good Character and Repentance 
Scholars argue that one of the justifications for plea bargaining is 
that it allows prosecutors to take human considerations into account156 
and, hence, to bypass the rigidity of the Sentencing Guidelines.157 
It may be argued, however, that laying stress on a dialogue that 
provides the defendant with the opportunity to present his good qualities 
 
 154.  Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Note, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea 
Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 115, 140 (1997).  
 155.  See generally James Dowden, United States v. Singleton: A Warning Shot Heard Round 
the Circuits? 40 B.C. L. REV. 897, 911 (1999); Langbein, supra note 4, at 18. 
 156.  Zacharias, supra note 103, at 1136, 1161. 
 157.  On this rigidity, see Stephen Schulhofer & Ilene Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-
Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1304-08 (1997).  
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may benefit manipulative defendants who succeed in deceiving with 
their charm. 
The defendant can simply fake repentance in order to gain a milder 
punishment.158 It is difficult to identify repentance or to evaluate its 
sincerity.159 After all, “if a jurisdiction reduces punishment for convicts 
who express contrition, it invites a parade of purely instrumental 
apologies into its sentencing procedures and risks rewarding the best 
actors rather than the most transformed.”160 At any rate, it is difficult to 
assess a defendant’s traits in the short span of time available to become 
familiar with him.161 
Additionally, most of an offender’s personal characteristics are not 
relevant to sentencing.162 However, defendants might prompt sympathy 
for reasons unrelated to the degree of guilt or degree of dangerousness. 
Sympathy and lack of sympathy for the defendant can be influenced by 
irrelevant grounds, such as race, gender, religion, and the social class to 
which the defendant belongs.163 The danger that the defendant would 
fake remorse or be judged by irrelevant criteria is not unique to plea 
bargaining negotiations; it also exists at a trial.164 Therefore, this 
argument fails to undermine the process of a true dialogue with the 
defendant. Moreover, if expressed repentance is revealed to be insincere, 
it can hurt the victim and enhance the injury caused by this person in the 
wake of the offense.165 Such insincerity would not personally hurt—
certainly not to the same degree—the prosecutor who conducts the 
negotiations with the defendant. 
D. Exerting Pressures on Innocent Defendants 
Scholars have discussed the danger of innocent defendants making 
 
 158.  Cheryl G. Bader, “Forgive Me Victim for I Have Sinned”: Why Repentance and the 
Offender Justice System Do Not Mix—A Lesson from Jewish Law, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 69, 94 
(2003). 
 159.  Jeffrie G. Murphy, Well Excuse Me!—Remorse, Apology, and Criminal Sentence, 38 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 371, 379 (2006). 
 160.  Nick Smith, Just Apologies: An Overview of the Philosophical Issues, 13 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L. J. 35 68 (2013). 
 161.  Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”: The 
Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3e1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1554-55 (1997). 
 162.  Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 157, at 1305. 
 163.  Id. at 1307 (relating to Sentencing pre-Guidelines). 
 164.  Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 141, at 2343; Kitai-Sangero & Lipschits, supra 
note 146, at 121-28.  
 165.  Lode Walgrave, Investigating the Potentials of Restorative Justice Practice, 36 WASH. 
U.J.L. & POL’Y 91, 126 (2011).  
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false guilty pleas as a result of plea bargaining.166 Such defendants have 
lost any confidence in their ability to be acquitted and so welcome any 
suggestion of leniency.167 Indeed, the leniency that the prosecution 
normally offers makes a guilty plea an attractive option for risk-averse 
defendants. And if, as has happened, the proposed plea bargain is very 
lenient, the defendant may feel unable to take the risk of going to trial.168 
Innocent defendants may face an even greater temptation to admit guilt 
than would guilty defendants because in light of the weakness of the 
incriminating evidence, the prosecutor offers them an attractive plea 
bargain that seems magnanimous and too good to turn down.169 Thus, 
increasing the attractiveness of plea bargains may have the adverse result 
of pressuring innocent defendants to participate in plea bargaining 
proceedings, thereby raising the risk of false convictions of innocent 
defendants. 
This concern has merit. However, there is hope that a true dialogue 
between the defendant and the prosecutor will convince the latter of the 
defendant’s innocence and bring about a dismissal of the indictment. 
It should be recalled that defendants need to admit guilt in order to 
participate in restorative justice processes.170 In those proceedings, too, 
there is the fear of a false confession by defendants.171 In plea bargaining 
negotiations as dialogue, the admission of guilt does not constitute a 
precondition for participation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Filing charges against a person alienates that individual from 
society. It makes the individual feel like a child, standing helpless 
against the greater power of adults. Throughout this Article, the 
protagonist of Camus’ The Stranger, Meursault, who is excluded from 
 
 166.  Gazal-Ayal, supra note 6, at 2298; Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea 
Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2008).  
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CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1154 (2005).  
 168.  CASPER, supra note 25, at 74; Leipold, supra note 167, at 1154.  
 169.  The Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 6, at 61; Gifford, supra note 106, at 60; Phil Fennell et 
al., Book Review, Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental and the Common Law 
Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 CRIM. L.F. 471, 474 (1996); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1535 (1981); Langer, supra note 117, at n. 240; 
Gazal-Ayal, supra note 6, at 2298-99; Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction 
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1015-16 (2011-12).  
 170.  Dancig-Rosenberg & Gal, supra note 141, at 2320.  
 171.  Id. at 2322-23.  
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both trial and life,172 has served as an example of this feeling of 
alienation. To help the defendant overcome this feeling, an accused 
individual should be treated respectfully, including the ability to 
reference made to his unique positive characteristics. Most importantly, 
the defendant should be allowed to take an active part in the criminal 
proceedings being conducted against him.173 
In The Stranger, everyone has something to say about the defendant 
except for the defendant himself.174 When he does speak, his words are 
seen as irrelevant. No one is listening or trying to understand what he is 
saying. His explanations are ignored or ridiculed. When Meursault says 
he killed because of the sun, he is mocked. The defense attorney quickly 
silences him and forces him to stay passive. No one attempts to find out 
what he meant. In fact, he does not participate in the trial. The lawyer 
speaks on his behalf. 
According to the adage, if you cannot beat them, join them. Given 
the ubiquity of plea bargaining and the fact that eradication of this 
process is not feasible in the foreseeable future, we should strive to 
derive the utmost benefit from this legal vehicle. Defendants’ perception 
of fairness is crucial to the legitimacy of the legal decision in their eyes. 
If defendants experience the procedure of plea bargaining as unfair, the 
legitimacy of legal authorities may be decreased and the defendants’ 
readiness to obey the law attenuated.175  People need to feel that what 
they say could have an influence on the outcome of the trial.176 Plea 
bargaining can and should be a device for empowerment. Case load 
pressure notwithstanding, defendants should be key players in the 
criminal justice proceedings to which they are subjected. Dispute 
settlement is an important component of doing justice. To this end, plea 
bargaining offers a unique opportunity to enable defendants participating 
in the process to bypass the prohibition of introducing character 
evidence, and to circumvent the need for the victim’s consent in 
restorative justice. Only a dialogic process may be meaningful for 
defendants if we want them to learn a lesson from their trial and to 
modify their conduct. Such a dialogue helps decrease the feeling of 
alienation that defendants normally experience, since it reflects a respect 
for human dignity. It is worth the price of rendering plea bargaining a bit 
 
 172.  David Carroll, Guilt by “Race”: Injustice in Camus’s The Stranger, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
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more complex. 
The ubiquity and plasticity of plea bargaining gives us the 
opportunity to shape new rules for the criminal justice process. With the 
new rules, Meursault’s urgent appeal “[i]t’s a serious matter for a man, 
being accused of murder. And I’ve something really important to tell 
you,”177 should receive a significant response during the plea bargaining 
process. Plea bargaining proceedings should heighten defendants’ 
participation in the process and convey to them an educational message. 
Waiving one’s right to a day in court does not imply waiving being 
addressed as a human being rather than as a number. 
 
 
 177.  CAMUS, supra note 9, at 124. 
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